Despite the evidence of a relationship between mass insurgency and welfare state expansion, there is little information about the process by which this occurs or the state's motivation. A favorable response to unrest by the state might plausibly result from one of two processes. On the one hand, the state may respond favorably as a strategy to control unrest. For example, transfer payments might be increased to pacify the insurgents, thus resulting in demobilization and cessation of violence. This is often labeled the social control perspective and has been put forth by neomarxists to explain the development and evolution of the welfare state as well as the survival of capitalism (e.g., Offe 1974; Poulantzas 1973).
When disorder subsides, the state slowly contracts the welfare rolls to keep labor markets competitive. This historical dynamic, they argue, was manifested most recently by the "relief explosion" that began during the late 1960s. Piven and Cloward claim that it was due in large part to the threat posed by widespread black violence that started with a wave of riots in 1964, followed by the insurgency of the (mostly black) poor throughout the remainder of the decade. The role of beneficent control in quelling insurrection is clear enough, but social control theories are often rather vague about the role of coercive control, or repression. Most scholars who address this subject suggest that the state will respond to social unrest by an increase in both beneficient and coercive controls. Piven and Cloward (1971) perceive a mixed strategy, even in the absence of democratic political institutions, in their historical account of European relief systems during the sixteenth century. Since "penalties alone" were not adequate to maintain order, "some localities began to augment punishment with provisions for the relief of the vagrant poor" (p. 8).
In developing a more general model of social control, Quinney (1974) 
The Neopluralist Perspective
At the heart of the classic pluralist interpretation of democratic politics are three assumptions. First, the means by which groups may communicate preferences to leaders are effective and accessible to all groups should they wish to use them. Second, sufficient competition among all groups exists so that no single group has a policymaking monopoly. Third, policymakers are open to demands put forth by any group that gains access to the policy arena (e.g., Dahl 1961 ).
An important corollary of this model with respect to social movements is that the use of unconventional political tactics is thus unnecessary and even pathological. The plausibility of this conclusion, as well as the adequacy of the classic pluralist model more generally, is perhaps most clearly questioned by the emergence and success of the civil rights movement in the United States, which effectively challenged the pluralist assumption that available (legal) means of political participation are available to all groups. This case led to new approaches to explain the use of unconventional political strategies and the rise of social movements. Modifications of the pluralist model concerning the origins of protest have become known as the resource mobilization and political process approaches to the study of social movements (e.g., Jenkins 1985; McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1973; Tilly 1978 ). According to these neopluralist models, the infrequent and often unexpected occurrence of insurgency is due to insufficient resources and opportunities for successful mobilization, which counters the classic pluralist position that insurgency is unnecessary.
The success of the civil rights movement in achieving its goals also led to a revision of the pluralist model regarding the consequences of protest. By the late 1960s, a number of modifications attempted to account for the rationality and effectiveness of unconventional politics but retained many of the model's core assumptions. Among the earliest and most influential of these was Lipsky's (1970) study of protest by the poor in New York. Consistent with neopluralist critiques, Lipsky saw the problem of powerless groups to be a lack of bargaining resources. The role of protest is to "activate third parties to enter the implicit or explicit bargaining arena in ways favorable to the protesters" (p. 2). The key to reaching these third parties, which Lipsky called "reference publics," is the mass media. Backed by the financial and organizational resources of reference publics, powerless groups may then be able to influence policy.
The role of protest, and more specifically that of political violence, has been incorporated into broader theoretical models of policymaking, which is clearly seen in the literature on agenda setting. Cobb, Ross, and Ross (1976) identify several stages of the agendabuilding process, along with characteristics of policies and groups that lead to different strategies for achieving access to the formal agenda. One particular strategy of agenda building is likely, they argue, when the relevant group originates from outside the government structure. In their outside initiative model, access to the formal agenda is achieved indirectly through issue expansion and eventual inclusion on the public agenda. At that point, access to the formal agenda is relatively easy, due to the interest aroused in a larger number of voters, and policymakers are likely to be inclined to act. The most critical stage for groups pursuing this strategy is issue expansion: "In order to be successful in getting on the formal agenda, outside groups need to create sufficient pressure or interest to attract the attention of decision makers" (p. 128). A common tactic, particularly among groups that are large in number but have few financial resources, is through "violence and threats of violence" (p. 131).2 Similar attempts to specify the potential outcomes of insurgency abound in the more recent literature on social movements. Generally speaking, these theories predict that insurgency may or may not be successful, depending upon a number of movement characteristics and/or environmental factors. Like Lipsky (1970) and Cobb, Ross, and Ross (1976), many of these scholars cite the importance of third-party support (e.g., Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1982) . Other works cite such factors as the "strength" of insurgent forces (Tilly 1978) , the nature of movement goals (e.g., Gamson 1975) , and the ability of insurgent groups to combine violence with conventional modes of participation (Gamson 1975) .
Despite differences, all these approaches share important features. First, the use of violence by aggrieved groups is assumed to be due to their inability to influence policymaking through conventional forms of participation. Second, success is thought to be contingent upon the nature of the political environment, most notably the level of public support for the insurgent group. Finally, and most important, although each of these models differs with the classic pluralist model regarding the utility of insurgency, all agree with it that the role of the state is to mediate among competing interests. In other words, although protest may be necessary for aggrieved groups to obtain access to the policy arena and the resources to compete effectively, once they reach the arena, the policymaking process is still a pluralist one. In the case of black insurgency, the specific implications are that any success in achieving issue expansion, gaining agenda access, and obtaining sufficient bargaining resources should have resulted in a favorable state response in one or more of the policy areas with which the insurgents were most concerned. Black violence can be linked to a host of grievances, but two categories dominated the responses of insurgents to surveys conducted in the aftermath of major riots in 1967 (National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 1968). These were impoverishment in urban ghettos, including poor housing and unemployment, and harsh treatment by the criminal justice system. These concerns also were emphasized by protest leaders in negotiations with white officials after many riots and were reflected in press coverage of the events. Thus, to the extent that insurgency was successful, neopluralist theory predicts that it should have resulted in an expansion of the welfare state and a less punitive criminal justice system. This model is displayed in Figure 2 .
Distinguishing between Models of Response
Despite the extensive empirical literature on the response to insurgency, work thus far has not distinguished between the models described above. This is due to the fact that the vast majority of these studies have only examined the relationship between black insurgency and welfare expansion. Most find that a relationship exists, but both the social control and the neopluralist theories predict such a relationship. Inherently, then, studies that examine a beneficent response alone cannot distinguish between the two models.
This problem does not exist with respect to research that examines the relationship between insurgency and criminal justice policy. Indeed, as can be seen by comparing figures 1 and 2, the competing theories suggest an opposite relationship between insurgency and criminal punitiveness. Very little research falls in this category, however. Welch (1975) examined citylevel responses to riots across several local expenditure categories. Based on a sample of all cities with more than 50,000 in population, she found the number of riots to be positively related to expenditures for police and fire protection but unrelated to expenditures for public welfare. The only research on the federal response to insurgency is by Button (1978) . Based on data from 40 cities, Button found that urban riots were positively related to both types of responses, to which he referred respectively as the "carrot" and the "stick." The only other study to examine both forms of response (Iris 1983 ) used interrupted time-series analysis for a sample of 35 large metropolitan areas to examine the effect of urban rioting on both AFDC and police expenditures. Like Button, Iris found that the response to disorder could be characterized as beneficent, because rioting was related to AFDC expansion. Unlike Welch and Button, however, Iris found no evidence of a coercive response, as rioting was unrelated to police expenditures. That finding is supported by two city-level studies that examine the law enforcement response to urban unrest (Jackson and Carroll 1981; Jacobs 1979) . In sum, the paucity of research and the inconsistent findings provide little guidance as to which of the competing theories of state response may be correct.
In an effort to distinguish between the two models, I employ several modifications to the studies described above. Although I analyze the response to insurgency with respect to both welfare and criminal justice policy, I examine responses at the state rather than the city level. States are the most important actors in the American federal system, at least with respect to these two policy areas. States are generally responsible for about half the welfare expenditures in the country. In the case of criminal justice, most arrests are made by local law enforcement agencies, but criminal courts are under state control, and nearly all convicted offenders are sent to state prisons. In addition, annual data for all states are available for nearly all the variables in this study, which is not the case at the city or county level. This permits a pooled cross-section time-series design, which has important inferential advantages over the designs used in previous studies. The period 1962-80 was chosen to include the entire span of black insurgency and yields an N of 912 cases.
Even with these modifications, it is possible that the findings across both types of response will be inconclusive. Consider the following. If a positive relationship were found between insurgency and welfare generosity, as empirical evidence leads us to believe, this would leave us with three possibilities. First, there might also be a positive relationship between insurgency and coercive control (criminal punitiveness), which would support the social control model. Second, there might be a negative relationship between insurgency and criminal punitiveness, which would be consistent with the neopluralist model, as it suggests that blacks were successful with respect to grievances in both policy areas. Third, despite a positive relationship between insurgency and welfare generosity, if insurgency and criminal punitiveness are unrelated, we would still be unable to distinguish between the two theories. This third combination of findings would be consistent with a social control response and might be expected when elites fear the electoral costs of coercion are too great. Yet, this situation also would be consistent with a neopluralist model, as the lack of a coercive response could be interpreted as a victory for insurgent blacks.
In the third combination of relationships we would be able to distinguish between the two models by examining two additional hypotheses. The first rests on assumptions of the two models regarding the relationship between welfare and criminal justice policy. According to the social control model, both policies perform the same function, that is, social control. Assuming cost constraints and a fixed demand for social control, we should expect investment in these two areas to be negatively and reciprocally related (Inverarity and Grattet 1989; Liska 1997; Spitzer 1975 ). In other words, there should be a tradeoff between welfare and criminal justice expenditures as policymakers seek to maintain a desired level of social control at the lowest possible cost. In the neopluralist model, however, such a relationship should not exist. Policymakers are expected to approach each policy area separately, responding only to the preferences and resources of the groups in the arena. These alternative relationships are represented in figures 1 and 2.
The second distinguishing hypothesis concerns the expected duration of the various responses to insurgency. According to the neopluralist perspective, a favorable state response represents an exercise of power by the insurgent group in the bargaining arena, and therefore policy changes can be seen as genuine reform. If so, we should expect these changes to be relatively permanent, ceteris paribus. To use the language of Tilly (1978) , the successful insurgent group, once a challenger from outside the polity, now becomes a member of the polity and henceforth has more or less direct access to the policy agenda. If the neopluralist model is correct, increases in welfare and decreases in criminal justice punitiveness should continue beyond the period of insurgency. In contrast, the social control model assumes that response to insurgency is driven by the need to reestablish order at the lowest possible cost. We should expect the state to reduce the overall level of social control investment once disorder subsides. Piven and Cloward (1971, 3) conclude with respect to a welfare response: "As turbulence subsides, the relief system contracts, expelling those who are needed to populate the labor market." Similarly, to the extent that the state responds with coercive controls, we should expect decreased investment in this strategy once disorder subsides.
AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF STATE RESPONSE TO BLACK INSURGENCY
I rely on insurgency data originally reported in Fording (1997) , where I defined insurgency as "any act of violence on behalf of blacks or minorities, either spontaneous or planned, which is either framed as or can be construed as politically motivated" (p. 11). The data cover collective acts of political violence (i.e., riots) as well as activities that involve fewer people, such as arson and sniping attacks, which were carried out by various black revolutionary groups. Violent acts are defined as rock throwing, vandalism, arson, looting, sniping, or beating of whites. Consistent with past research, insurgency is measured as the number of incidents. Data were collected for 923 events.3
A Model of State Welfare Generosity
Consistent with past research, welfare generosity is measured as the annual growth (change) in the number of AFDC recipients per one million state population in each state. This measure, as opposed to benefit levels or expenditures, is chosen due to the emphasis given this dimension of welfare policy by social control explanations (Piven and Cloward 1971) . Although the social control approach does not preclude the possibility that insurgency may be related to AFDC benefit levels as well, Piven and Cloward argue that the effect on recipient rates should be strongest, since it is presumed that the primary source of insurgency, and thus the target of state control, is the unruly poor who are not currently receiving government aid.
Exogenous variables for this model are suggested in past research on AFDC growth and on the growth of social welfare programs generally. Broadly conceptualized, several of these approaches to explaining welfare policy comprise what Rochefort (1986) has termed the progressive perspective. Other explanations focus on changes in welfare programs originating at the federal level, the characteristics of state political institutions, and the extension and expansion of political rights for the poor.
The Progressive Perspective. Within this general approach, different theorists have stressed various factors, but all the explanations share the position that welfare policy is primarily driven by the benevolent motives of policymakers and the needs of poor. To the extent that at least some motivation is humanitarian, we should expect change in AFDC rolls to be related to the size of the needy population, as measured by the annual change in the number of female-headed households in poverty and by the annual change in the level of unemployment in a state (e.g., Fording 1997; Isaac and Kelly).
Theorists also have linked welfare expansion to increased capacity to afford social welfare and to the increase in social pathologies caused by urbanization (e.g., Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965). To capture these effects, I include Per Capita Income and Per Capita State Revenue as measures of economic capacity (each measured as the annual change) as well as the annual change in the level of urbanization in a state (Urban3Another form of insurgency potentially relevant here are the relatively disruptive yet nonviolent protests by various welfare rights groups, many organized under the leadership of the National Welfare Rights Organization. Because these protests were nonviolent, they did not receive much attention from the major news media, and they are not included in this analysis. Political Citizenship. Some theorists suggest that welfare expansion is associated with periodic expansion of "citizenship," that is, the evolution and extension of social and political rights (e.g., Gronbjerg 1977). One of the most important periods in this regard was the 1960s, and two dimensions of this expansion are incorporated into the analysis.
First, due to significant changes in voting qualifications that affected both blacks and whites (e.g., abolition of poll tax), masses of poor people were effectively enfranchised for the first time during the 1960s, which presumably altered the class composition of the electorate. Therefore, Class Bias is adopted from Husted and Kenny (1997), a measure that captures the expansion of the electorate during the 1960s as well as variation in the relative participation of the poor over the period of this analysis. Because it reflects the degree to which the poor are underrepresented in the electorate, class bias (measured as the annual change) is expected to have a negative effect on AFDC expansion.
Second, important court decisions ended decades (in some cases) of extreme malapportionment and gave densely populated poorer districts more power, which may have contributed to welfare expansion. I include Reapportionment and model this process as an intervention, that is, the variable has a nonzero value only for the first year after the first significant reappointment was implemented in a state.8 The variable is not dichotomous, however, because the intervention value represents the magnitude of malapportionment (alternatively, the extent of reapportionment) that existed previously. Reapportionment is expected to result in greater representation for the urban poor, so it is expected to be positively related to AFDC growth.
A Model of State Criminal Punitiveness
The criminal justice response to insurgency is hypothesized to be reflected by the change in incarceration rates and is measured as the annual change in the number of prisoners in state prisons per one million population. In addition to black insurgency, several other variables are hypothesized to influence growth in state incarceration rates.
Criminal Involvement. Many criminologists cite the stability of punishment thesis, that is, incarceration rates remain relatively stable over time and change in response to society's tolerance for crime, rather than in response to crime itself. Several studies have found crime to be an important determinant of incarceration rates (e.g., Carroll is an important determinant of sentencing outcomes because it indicates the likelihood that the defendant will continue to commit crime. Based on both of these hypotheses, the annual change in a state's unemployment rate is included in the incarceration model. Unemployment is expected to be positively related to incarceration.
In similar vein, many researchers posit a direct relationship between level of poverty and incarceration (e.g., Taggert and Winn 1993). Consistent with the threat hypothesis for unemployment, states with a higher level of inequality might be subject to greater potential threat from the lower classes, which could result in a greater level of incarceration. As with unemployment, however, an alternative explanation can be given for a positive relationship between inequality and incarceration. Defendants with sufficient financial resources can purchase competent defense and can sustain numerous appeals upon conviction, which increases the probability that they will not be incarcerated for very long, if at all. Consistent with other studies, I include Poverty, measured as the annual change in state poverty rates, as a measure of inequality.9
Finally, as noted earlier, two indicators of a state's economic'capacity, per capita state income and per capita state revenue, are included. The direction of their effect on incarceration is not entirely clear. On the one hand, wealthy states may be able to afford more prisons, so economic prosperity should be positively related to incarceration. On the other hand, for the same reasons we expect poverty to be positively related to incarceration, we might expect per capita state income and revenue to be negatively related to incarceration.
State Political Institutions. As with welfare policies, several features of state political institutions and ideology are hypothesized to affect state incarceration rates. Relatively liberal voters, Democratic control of state government, competitive party systems, reapportionment, and extensive political participation by the poor and blacks are all expected to contribute to more lenient sentencing and parole policies, more alternatives to imprisonment, and hence lower incarceration rates, ceteris paribus. Although political variables have not been incorporated into many studies of incarceration rates in the past, recent research finds that political forces are an important determinant (e.g., Taggert and Winn 1993).
Military Mobilization Rates. Many studies have noted
a negative correlation between military participation rates and incarceration rates. This is not surprising, given a presumed indirect influence of military participation rates through some of the variables discussed above (e.g., unemployment and poverty). A direct relationship also may exist; Inverarity and Grattet (1989, 357) note the "legal folklore" that, during times of war, "judges commonly offer young miscreants a choice between jail and enlistment." In any case, a direct relationship is supported to some extent by empirical research that controls for some of the variables (but not all) through which military mobilization might influence incarceration indirectly (e.g., Cappell and Sykes 1991). Based on this possibility, I include Military, measured as the annual change in the number of individuals in the state in the armed forces (active duty).
The Conditional Effect of Insurgency
The strength of the relationship between insurgency and welfare depends on two important contextual factors (Fording 1997) . First, presumably due to electoral incentives of policymakers, a welfare response only occurs when the insurgent group achieves effective electoral access (defined as both voting right and electoral systems that are not malapportioned). Second, as suggested by Keech (1968) , during periods of effective electoral access, the influence of insurgency on AFDC growth is strongest in states with a relatively small black population (presumably due to a low level of white resistance) and in states with a relatively large black population (presumably due to black electoral influence).
In other words, the insurgency effect is curvilinear (U-shaped) over the black population range of values and is weakest in the middle range (Fording 1997, 21). Based on this finding, a similar interactive specification is applied to the welfare model in this research.10
With respect to insurgency and incarceration, two curvilinear interactions are possible in the context of black electoral access. In a neopluralist model, a generally negative relationship would be expected between insurgency and incarceration across the range of black population size, as this is representative of a beneficient response. Consistent with the pattern of response found for AFDC, however, we would expect states in the middle range of black population size to show a relatively weak beneficient response, as blacks in these states simultaneously experience a relatively high level of white resistance and a low level of black electoral strength (Keech 1968) . In a social control model, however, a generally positive relationship would be expected between insurgency and incarceration, as this is representative of a coercive response. Moreover, in this case the magnitude of the relationship should be strongest in the middle range, again due to the (presumed) combination of white resistance and weak black electoral influence.
For each dependent variable, the conditional relationship is incorporated by estimating a model in which insurgency is hypothesized to interact with black electoral access and the size of the black population. To capture the effect of black electoral access, I adopt a dichotomous measure from Fording (1997) The Durability of Response. Another distinguishing hypothesis necessitates modeling both the short-and long-term effects of insurgency. Here it is important to consider the way in which the dependent variables, AFDC and incarceration, as well as insurgency are measured. The dependent variables are measured as changes (first-differences), whereas insurgency is measured simply as the number of incidents of political violence. Therefore, if insurgency is found to have an effect on either dependent variable for a particular lag length, the effect is assumed to result in a permanent increase in the level of that variable; in the language of time-series analysis, an intercept change in the level of the dependent variable occurs. This is consistent with the notion of lasting reform posited by the neopluralist model but inconsistent with the social control model, which suggests that welfare and incarceration levels will decline once disorder subsides. In order to test both models simultaneously, it is necessary to include multiple lags of insurgency. According to social control theory, a significant positive effect (for either dependent variable) eventually will be followed by a negative effect as the state readjusts the level of assistance/ incarceration necessary to achieve social control. To accomplish this, I examine the effect of insurgency for up to seven lags. Lags lengths for other variables are determined by theory or, when theory is ambiguous, empirically (t-values). The entire model to be estimated, along with hypothesized relationships for both the welfare model and the incarceration model, is presented in Figure 3 .
ESTIMATION AND RESULTS
The framework for this analysis is a pooled crosssectional time-series design. To arrive at the final set of results, I engaged in three rounds of estimation. The first used an iterative process to determine the proper lags for the effect of insurgency, beginning with a strictly additive model that contained lags of up to seven years, and the lags that exhibited the strongest effects were retained.12 The second round introduced interaction terms for the insurgency variables, dropped any interactions that did not appear significant (based on joint F-tests) or theoretically plausible, and reestimated. These results are presented as model 1 in tables 1 and 2 for both AFDC and incarceration. Based on these results, the third round estimated a final parsimonious model, retaining all variables that exhibited both the correct sign and a t-value of at least 1.0 in absolute value. These final results are presented as model 2 in tables 1 and 2.
Explaining State Welfare Generosity
Many scholars refer to the late 1960s as the "relief explosion," due to the innovation and expansion that occurred across a variety of public assistance programs, especially AFDC. What was responsible for this massive increase in welfare participation? The answer may be at least partially provided in Table 1, insurgency is lagged two years). As in my 1997 analysis, the effect of insurgency is near zero when blacks did not have electoral access. Once they achieved electoral power, however, the effect indeed appears to be strong and varies significantly across the black population range in a curvilinear manner. Using slope coefficient estimates from Table 1 , and setting the contextual variables of power and black to the desired values, the effect of insurgency when access has been achieved can be estimated for the range of values of the black population observed throughout the 1962-80 period. These estimated effects, depicted graphically in Figure  4 , generally reflect the curvilinear pattern reported in my earlier analysis (Fording 1997) . At a two-year lag and in states where blacks comprise less than 3% of the population, each incident of insurgency is predicted to cause an increase in AFDC growth of 250-300 recipients per million population. When the black population is larger, the effect of insurgency diminishes, although not as significantly as my original results suggest. In states in which at least 30% of the population is black, each episode of insurgency is estimated to produce an increase in AFDC growth of at least 500 recipients per million population.
Explaining State Criminal Punitiveness
The results for the incarceration model are presented in Table 2 , which reveals that the strongest effects originate from state economic conditions. Unemployment and poverty both exhibit relatively strong positive relationships with incarceration rates, whereas higher state revenue is associated with a reduction. As with welfare generosity, the influence of political variables is significant but not especially striking. Both Democratic control and interparty competition are negatively related to incarceration, which is consistent with hypotheses that liberal control of political institutions or competitive party systems in the state produces more liberal policies. The other political variablesideology, reapportionment, and class bias-all proved insignificant.
The effect of insurgency on incarceration was estimated in the same manner as for AFDC, by an iterative procedure that isolated the potentially significant lags and then determined the significance of the various interactions. The results clearly demonstrated that the effect of insurgency is not conditional as hypothesized, so an additive specification was used to generate the final results presented in Table 2 . This is not to say that insurgency is unrelated to incarceration, however, as can be seen by examining the coefficient value for the two-year lag of insurgency, which indicates a positive and significant relationship. According to the results, each act of insurgency is predicted to increase incarceration by about 23 prisoners (per million population), holding other variables constant.
These results have two important theoretical implications. First, they provide support for the social control theory of state response, in particular a model in which the state increases both coercive and beneficent types of controls when threatened. Second, the for the effect of insurgency on incarceration. In Table  2 , we see that the positive effect of insurgency at a lag of two years is matched by a negative effect at a lag of three years.15 This temporal pattern across the two dimensions of response provides additional support for the social control model: The levels of social control increase in response to insurgency and then decline when disorder subsides. Returning to the dynamics of the welfare response, since it was found that AFDC expansion is contingent upon electoral considerations represented by size of the black population, we might expect the extent of AFDC contraction to be conditional upon the electoral context as well. Based on the coefficient estimates in model 2 of Table 1 , this appears to be the case to some degree.16 The dashed line in Figure 4 displays the predicted effect of insurgency at a lag of five years across the range of values for the black population. As we can see, the picture that emerges here is somewhat different from that for AFDC expansion with the two-year lag. At lower levels of black population, the AFDC rolls appear to contract somewhat after order is restored, which does not appear to be the case at higher population levels. It seems that black electoral strength helps protect concessions made during disorder from being lost over time.
Thus far, the results across the two dimensions of response provide strong support for the social control model. Further support would be gained if it were found that AFDC and incarceration are reciprocally related, indicating that the two policy dimensions at least partly serve the same function of social control. This hypothesis is supported in tables 1 and 2, where coefficient estimates for the effect of incarceration on AFDC and for the effect of AFDC on incarceration are both negative and significant.
The Cumulative Effect of Insurgency
In combination with the direct influence of insurgency and the conditional nature of both the long-and short-term effects, a welfare-incarceration tradeoff would suggest that the overall effect of insurgency may be quite complex. As the cumulative effect of insurgency is not easily discernible from tables 1 and 2, I present Figure 5 , which displays predicted levels of AFDC recipient rates and incarceration rates for two hypothetical states. To generate these estimates, predicted values for changes in AFDC and incarceration were first calculated, holding the values of all exogenous noninsurgency variables constant at representative values, which allowed the total effect of insurgency (direct and indirect effects combined) to be isolated. These predicted change values (i.e., first differences) were then converted to levels for ease of interpretation 1.8 (*p < .05). Moving to the reduced model (models 1 and 2, as reported in Table 2 ), however, a lag of two years proved to be significant, whereas a lag of one year did not. 15 The coefficient estimate for the lag of insurgency at three years is not quite significant at the .05 level (p = .06), but given the inherent multicolinearity in distributed lag models, I treat it as such. 16 In estimating the interactive effect of insurgency in the case of AFDC contraction, the results in Table 1 (model 1) indicate that coefficient values for the interaction terms are not significant. As this result may be due to multicolinearity, and given the shape of the curve in Figure 4 representing a lag of two years, I used the natural log of black population, rather than black population and its square, to model the conditional effect of insurgency in model 2. This specification shows a larger effect (p = .07). , and black population size was large (30%). In this category are most of the states in the Deep South. Due to the relatively strong expansive effect of insurgency on welfare generosity, coupled with the durability of this policy in the years following unrest, the long-term influence of insurgency is quite significant. There is a relatively permanent increase in AFDC levels, and the predicted tradeoff between social control strategies contributes to a relatively permanent decrease in the level of incarceration. Figure 5 depicts two very different scenarios, and we are left to wonder whether and how these effects might have combined into a national picture over the same period. This can be seen in Figure 6 , which plots observed AFDC recipients rates, incarceration rates, and levels of insurgency during 1962-80. There is evidence of the pronounced inverse relationship between AFDC and incarceration found in the state-level analyses presented above. In addition, the national trends resemble the pattern in Figure 5A more than the pattern in Figure 5B . This is not surprising, because the values of black population size and the level of violence used to calculate panel A are more typical across states than those used to generate panel B.
CONCLUSION
Although a relationship between mass unrest and welfare expansion has been established in several contexts, relatively little effort has been applied by social scientists to uncover the causal mechanisms. This research indicates that the social control perspective may provide the most valid explanation for this relationship in the case of black insurgency. Further work is necessary to determine whether these findings are applicable to other democratic systems, but this analysis may help explain important policy developments both past and present within the United States.
A widely debated historical question concerns the motivation behind New Deal legislation during the Great Depression, a period of unprecedented welfare state expansion to address the needs of the poor, the unemployed, labor, and the aged (e.g., Ametha, Dunleavey, and Bernstein 1994; Goldfield 1989; Piven and Cloward 1977; Quadango 1984; Skocpol 1980). A key
